This paper analyzes the effects of bank mergers on bank-firm relationships. Using matched bank-firm level data, I find that mergers disrupt lending relationships, specially to small borrowers of target banks. However, I find significant positive effects of mergers for borrowers that continue the lending relationship with the consolidated bank.
Introduction
The current trend of banking consolidation both within countries and cross-borders has raised concerns that small business may find it harder to obtain finance from increasingly large and complex financial institutions. Small and informationally opaque firms, highly dependent on banking finance to undertake their projects, would be the most directly affected. A noticeable acceleration in consolidation activity in the last decade has encouraged the proliferation of empirical studies that contribute to this debate. Most of these studies analyze banks' aggregate effects because little evidence on individual small borrowers is available. This paper adds to a less developed strand of the literature by analyzing the impact of bank consolidation on borrowers of merging banks by using data on bank-firm relationships in Spain.
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Bank mergers have the potential to either benefit or harm borrowers. On the one hand, mergers may generate efficiency gains -cost savings, revenue enhancing, and greater bank size can yield economies of scale and scope and increase diversification opportunities-. Borrowers will benefit to the extent that consolidated banks pass on efficiency gains to them. On the other hand, bank mergers increase market concentration. Borrowers will be harmed to the extent that consolidated banks exert their market power. In addition to this traditional merger trade-off, small business lending is characterized by the role of lenders on gathering and generating soft information about borrowers through long lasting lending relationships that help overcome informational asymmetries in credit markets. A priori, bank mergers could foster or inhibit lending relationships. This paper analyzes the potential positive and negative effects of bank mergers to small business borrowers: Do bank mergers harm or benefit firm borrowers? In particular, the paper sheds light to the following questions: Are consolidated banks more likely to terminate their relationships with borrowers? What are the consequences of bank consolidation on prices? Are some particular types of borrowers more likely to be 3 adversely affected by banking mergers? Are some particular types of mergers more likely to adversely affect SMEs?
The empirical analysis is divided into two main parts. First, I examine whether banking consolidation disrupts lending relationships. I estimate the probability of terminating existing lending relationships with merging banks and also examine whether it is harder for small businesses seeking new funding sources to establish a new lending relationship with consolidated banks. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to document initiation of lending relationships by consolidated banks. Second, I analyze the effect of banking mergers on average loan interest rates. If bank mergers create efficiency gains that are passed on to borrowers, loan rates for merging bank borrowers would decline.
2 If the increase in market power outweighs merger gains, then the opposite sign would be observed.
I find several interesting results. Firms who borrow from target banks are more likely to lose their credit relationship with the consolidated bank than would otherwise identical borrowers from non-merging banks. Target borrowers are the ones who suffer the most in terms of relationship termination. I also find that borrowers seeking to start a new lending relationship have lower probability of initiating it with a consolidated bank than with other non-merging banks. That is, small businesses find it harder to get a loan from consolidated banks. These results suggest a somewhat negative effect of bank mergers to small business.
The second part of the analysis examines the effect of mergers on interest rates. The main result is that interest rates decrease when one of the lending banks participates in a merger. The decline in interest rates suggests that mergers are beneficial for borrowers that continue the lending relationship with the merging bank. This result supports the view that banking mergers generate efficiency gains which to some extent are passed on to small business.
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Having identified an overall beneficial effect of bank mergers on interest rates of continuing borrowers, I focus on examining its relevance and heterogeneity through various dimensions. First, I analyze whether the effect on interest rates is temporary or permanent. One might argue that a temporary decline may just reflect, for instance, some strategic price cuts to extend the market share rather than reveal more fundamental operational improvements in the consolidated bank. I find support for a permanent reduction on interest rates, which reinforces the evidence that mergers benefit continuing borrowers.
Second, I find that the average reduction in loan spreads is larger for target borrowers than for acquirer borrowers. Since target banks are usually more inefficient than acquiring banks, this result provides support for the hypothesis of efficiency gains of mergers that benefit target borrowers the most.
Third, I explore the "size effect" in lending. There is an extensive literature that explores whether small banks tend to lend to small businesses and large banks tend to lend to large businesses. If that is the case, larger banks resulting from banking consolidation may severely impact the credit availability and contract terms for small firms (Peek and Rosengren 1998 , Berger et al. 1998 , Strahan and Weston 1998 . I find that the largest decline in interest rates corresponds to mergers involving the largest banks, which contradicts the "size effect". Interestingly, I find large drops in interest rates of borrowers of small target banks that are acquired by a large bank. This suggests that small borrowers of small banks are prime beneficiaries from transferring the lending relationship to a larger bank.
Fourth, I explore the heterogeneous effects of ownership form of merging banks. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to address this issue. Spanish banks differ on their form of ownership and governance structure. Commercial banks are shareholderoriented banks while saving banks have the ownership form of a private foundation (Crespí et al. 2004) . Consistent with the property rights view, the largest reductions in interest rates are for target borrowers when two commercial banks merge.
Five, I find heterogeneous effects of bank mergers depending on the degree of market overlap. In-market mergers (involving banks that previously operated in the same geographical area) benefit target borrowers the most; out-of-market mergers benefit acquiring borrowers the most. Finally, I also find evidence of a market power effect.
Mergers that induce a significant increase in local market concentration have a smaller impact on interest rates, reflecting the fact that consolidated banks may exploit their market power. Nevertheless, the market power effect is never large enough to offset efficiency gains.
I obtain interesting insights by dividing the sample according to the size of the borrower. I find that the smallest borrowers in the sample who are clients of target banks have a higher probability of having their lending relationship with the consolidated bank terminated and have a lower probability to initiate a new relationship with consolidated banks. I also find that the smallest and youngest borrowers in the sample that continue the lending relationship are the ones who enjoy higher interest rate declines. Taken together, these results suggest that smallest firms are disproportionally harmed by bank mergers in terms of loan supply, but those that continue the relationship benefit from having a relationship with a more efficient bank.
Taken together the results suggest a negative effect of bank mergers in terms of an increased likelihood of terminating a lending relationship for target banks. On the positive side, firms that continue the relationship with the consolidated bank experience the highest reduction on interest rate. based on a bank officer gathering soft information, is likely to be higher for these firms.
Hence, any impact of bank mergers on SMEs may have important policy implications.
This paper contributes to the literature on banking consolidation and its effects to small business. Many of these papers rely on aggregate lending data from U.S. banks (Peek and Rosengren 1998 , Berger et al. 1998 , Strahan and Weston 1998 . There is a small but growing literature that analyzes bank mergers from the small borrower perspective.
Sapienza (2002) uses a loan-level data set for Italy to analyze dynamic effects of bank mergers. She finds that in-market mergers involving relatively small targets result in lower interest rates charged on loans and that mergers increase the probability of borrowers being cut off their credit lines. Erel (2006) performs a similar analysis for the U.S. and finds that interest rates decline after bank mergers. This paper is similar to Sapienza (2002) and Erel (2006) in exploring the effect of mergers on relationship termination and loan prices. One of the main contribution of this paper is the use of firm level data to control for borrower size instead of relying on loan size as a proxy. This reveals to be particularly relevant to study firm size/bank-size relation. Consistent with their findings, my results show a decline of interest rates after a bank merger. Unlike the U.S. and Italy, the decline in interest rate for small Spanish firms is observed even when large banks with market overlap merge.
Some related studies on bank mergers at the firm level are Bonaccorsi and Patti (2007) that analyze the impact of mergers on credit availability in Italy. They look at heterogeneous effects by borrower characteristics. They fail to find evidence on stronger effects for borrowers that are small, more risky and dependent on fewer lenders. Using a Belgium dataset, Degryse et al. (2006) analyze bank-firm relationships and find heterogeneous impacts of mergers. Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) use a survey of small U.S firms 1995 (NFIB) and find that banking mergers had no significant effect on availability of credit or loan contract terms to small firms.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the main features of the Spanish banking consolidation. Section 3 describes the data and the sample.
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Section 4 analyzes whether banking consolidation disrupts lending relationships.
Section 5 analyzes the price effect of mergers on the continuing borrowers of the consolidated institutions. Section 6 concludes.
Banking consolidation in Spain
This paper studies the impact of bank mergers on lending relationships and loan interest rates to non-financial Spanish firms in the period 1996-2005. The period analyzed is characterized by intense merger activity involving banks of all sizes and of different ownership form. In 1996, firms in the sample had 23.5 percent of lending relationships with large banks; by the end of the sample this figure has increased to 56 percent. The
Spanish banks also differ in ownership form. There are three main types of institutions:
commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives, which compete under equal conditions in the loan, deposit and financial service markets. Commercial and savings banks are much more important than cooperatives. Together, they account for more than 95% of the loan and deposit markets. In this paper, I focus in these two types.
Commercial banks are companies owned by shareholders which hold the residual decision rights. Savings banks are not-for-profit commercial organizations whose profits are either retained or paid as a social dividend and the decision rights correspond to public authorities, depositors, workers, and the founding entity. I do not consider credit cooperatives in the analysis, which may be regarded as mutual thrifts.
Additionally, official credit institutions are public entities created by the Spanish government to promote savings, economic growth, access to credit, improve wealth distribution, enhance strategic economic activities, etc. Specifically, the sample of firms is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million. Within the SME category, a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million. A micro enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €2 million. Firms need to have at least two consecutive observations to be included in the sample. If both consolidated and non consolidated accounts are available, the non consolidated ones are percent of the total population of Spanish SME with at least one employee in that year. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of some variables for the firms in the sample.
In the analysis presented in section 4 the unit of analysis is a bank-firm relationship.
The sample is comprised by 1,351,069 bank-firm-year observations corresponding to 300,225 bank-firm relationships.
The analysis on price effects of mergers in section 5 is conducted at the firm level. The dependent variable is the average interest rate that firms pay for external finance (Interest rate). For a given firm and year, the average interest rate is calculated by dividing the financial expenses at the end of the year by the average amount of debt held during that year (debt at the beginning of the year plus debt at the end of the year divided by two). This computation generates some extreme values in the average interest rate for some observations. Therefore, the variable is winsorized at the 99.5 percentile, which corresponds to an interest rate of 23.88 percentage points (this procedure affects 3061 firm-year observations).
The data provides information on the name of the lenders, but there is no disaggregated information at the loan level. Although this data limitation prevents to measure the effect on interest rates of those loan granted by merging banks, it has the advantage that I can measure the impact on the average interest rate paid in subsequent periods even when the lending relationships is terminated. Existing research in Italy (Sapienza 2002) , the U.S. (Erel 2005) and Belgium (Degryse et al. 2005 ) evidences higher discontinuation rates for target borrowers. My results in section 5 are consistent with this finding. The advantage of this dataset is that I can control for is the average interest rate that a firm pays even when the relationship is terminated. 
The effect of bank mergers on termination and initiation of lending relationships
The primary source of small business finance are banks, and usually, small firms tend to concentrate their borrowing at a single or few banks. Bank mergers may adversely affect small business if consolidating banks are more likely to terminate ongoing lending relationships with existing borrowers. Furthermore, banking consolidation can make it more difficult for small business seeking new financing sources to start a lending relationship with a newly consolidated financial institution. In this section I examine whether this is the case. For the first hypothesis, I estimate a probit model on the probability of terminating a relationship as a function of lenders' merger activity.
For the second hypothesis, I estimate a probit model for the probability of initiating a relationship as a function of lenders' recent merger activity.
The specifications of the models are the following: Both models include a set of firm characteristics and lender characteristics. All regressions include year dummies and province dummies. it is assumed to be a zero mean, randomly distributed error term. All reported coefficients are the marginal effects on the probability of discontinuing the lending relationship evaluated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables.
Firm characteristics measured at t-1 are included in the model. The logarithm of total assets (Log firm assets) and of sales (Log firm sales) as measures of firm size. Some financial ratios: proportion of current assets over current liabilities (Liquidity), ratio of fixed assets over liabilities to control for the tangibility of its assets (Collateral), EBIT over assets to measure firm profitability (Firm ROA) and firm liabilities scaled by total assets (Leverage). I additionally include the Altman Z-score as independent variable in the regression to capture the firm credit risk. 10 This is a compound measure built from accounting ratios that helps to predict how close a firm is to bankruptcy (Altman 1968) .
A higher Z-score implies a lower default risk. I use the logarithm of age (Log firm age)
14 to capture the effect of firm life cycle. The Number of lenders at t-1 is also included in the regression to control for the differential effects of firms with multiple relationships compared to firms with only one lending relationship.
As for lender characteristics, I include bank size (Log lender assets) and bank profitability (Lender ROA). I also include dummies for bank size. 11 Finally, HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) of bank branches by province and year is included in the regression as a measure of banking market concentration. 13 Target borrowers have a higher probability of terminating a relationship (+1.8 percentage points) while acquiring borrowers have a lower probability of terminating the relationship (-0.7 percentage points). Existing studies also find a higher discontinuation rate for target borrowers than for acquirer borrowers (Sapienza 2002 , Degryse et al. 2005 . This finding suggests that target borrowers are the most hurt by banking consolidation.
11 Following Delgado et al. (2007) , banks are grouped into three size classes: small (€1000 million in total loans or less), medium (between €1000 and 25,000 million) and large (above €25,000 million). 12 The HHI is a market concentration measure computed as the sum of the squares of each bank's market share for all banks in a market. The number of branches that each bank has in each province by year is used to compute the HHI because no information currently exists concerning the regional distribution of the representative variables of banking output (deposits, loans). Only regional branch distribution data are available. Therefore, market shares are calculated using regional branch distribution data which proxies for deposit distribution. 13 The number of observations in the regressions is reduced to 1142521 due to missing values in some explanatory variables.
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So far, I interpreted a discontinuation of a lending relationship as being a bank's choice and being harmful from the borrower point of view. The reason for that interpretation is that the literature on lending relationships establishes that longer and stronger bank-firm relationships are value enhancing as it is reflected on a higher probability of obtaining a loan (Cole 1998 ), lower loan rates (Petersen and Rajan 1994, D'Auria et al. 1999) , and lower collateral requirements Udell 1995, Harhoff and Körting 1998) . In light of these findings one would expect that continuing the lending relationship should be optimal from the borrower point of view. Moreover, in the next section I examine the effect of relationship termination and switching behavior on interest rates. The results
show that continuing borrowers are the ones that benefit more from banking consolidation, which reinforces the interpretation that borrowers would prefer to continue the lending relationship if allowed to do so.
However, as Korceski et al. (2006) argue, this might not always the case. When switching costs vary across different types of customers it is not obvious whether the welfare effect of continue/terminate a relationship with a consolidated bank is, on balance, positive or negative. On the one hand, firms with high switching costs do not terminate the relationship because they are locked in the relationship and find it difficult to start new lending relationships because of adverse selection problems in credit markets (Sharpe 1990 , Rajan 1992 . If that is the case, continue the relationship would be harmful from the borrower point of view. On the other hand, firms with low switching costs may find it profitable to drop the consolidated bank and start new lending relationships. It may even be the case that they do not need to start a new relationship and they just need to switch the funding amount from the merging bank to previously existing relationships. If this is the case, borrowers terminating the relationship with the merging bank will be better off. In this context, the coefficients in table 4 have no obvious interpretation. The higher probability of terminating a relationship for target borrowers may reflect the fact that target banks are generally weak and badly managed banks and thus they are also more likely to lose customers.
14 In that sense, the discontinuation of a lending relationship may reflect a borrower's choice instead of a bank decision.
14 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out this caveat and suggesting how to address it.
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In order to disentangle this competing interpretations, I divide the sample of firms into low and high quality borrowers using several observed characteristics. In the scenario of a weak target bank, one would expect that all types of firms (low and high quality) will decide to terminate the lending relationship with the target bank. On the contrary, if banks take the decision to terminate the lending relationship, one should observe banks severing relationships with low quality firms. I estimate model (1) with the variables Target borrower and Acquirer borrower interacted with three dummy variables (D1, D2, D3) that proxy for firm quality: size, age and z-score.
The results can be found in columns 2 to 4 in panel A, table 4. The regressions show that target borrowers have a higher probability of terminating a relationship while acquiring borrowers have a lower probability of terminating the relationship. The last two rows test the equality of the coefficients Target*D1 and Target*D3. For size and age the null hypothesis is rejected, which shows that smaller and younger firms are more likely to terminate a relationship with a target bank. This result is consistent with Degryse et al. (2006) . When firms are divided according to the z-score (column 4) the difference is no longer significant at 5%. Taken together the results support the hypothesis that the most informationally opaque firms are the ones that are more hurt by lending relationship discontinuation as a consequence of mergers. It seems plausible to assume that banks are generally the ones who terminate lending relationships with small businesses.
The regression controls for firm characteristics. Larger, older, more levered, more profitable and firms with more lenders have a higher probability that the lending relationship is terminated. More liquid and less risky, as measured by the Z-score, have a lower probability. The regression also controls for bank characteristics. The most significant effect is for bank profitability. More profitable lenders are much less likely to terminate the lending relationship than unprofitable ones. This coefficient is basically capturing bank bankruptcy. Larger banks are less likely to terminate lending relationships than their smaller counterparts. Once more, the results support the hypothesis that the most opaque firms are more negatively affected by bank mergers.
The effect of bank mergers on average interest rates
In this section I examine how the average interest rate on business debt changes due to lenders' merger activity, controlling for several firm characteristics, lenders' characteristics and local credit market controls. I start by estimating a basic model to measure the overall impact of bank mergers on loan rates, and then, I analyze differential effects by various dimensions: target and acquirer borrowers, characteristics of the borrowers, characteristics of banks involved in mergers, and different market structures.
The basic model and definition of variables
To examine the effect of mergers on the average interest rate that a firm pays on its The standard errors are clustered at the regional (province) level .
Data on observable firm characteristics measured at t-1 are used to reduce the impact of heterogeneity of firms in our sample. Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) This supports the efficiency hypothesis that banks pass on borrowers some of the benefits generated in bank mergers.
Main results
As far as the characteristics of the firm are concerned, size (measured by firm assets) displays the negative expected sign. Larger firms obtain cheaper external finance. Firms more indebted and with higher growth opportunities (measured by firm sales) have higher cost of capital. Age has a positive effect on cost of capital. Profitability, liquidity 20 and the availability of collateral have a positive effect on cost of capital. Surprisingly, the Z-score variable that controls for firm creditworthiness has a positive sign; it does not confirm Rajan's (1992) theoretical prediction that firms with a higher probability of failure should suffer more from informational hold-up problems. The larger the number of lenders the larger the average interest rate on loans.
The regression also controls for bank characteristics. The most significant effect is for bank profitability. I find that larger and more profitable lenders charge lower interest rates on loans. Finally, the coefficient for HHI is positive but non-significant, showing that greater banking market concentration tends to increase interest rates but the relationship is not strong.
Temporary and permanent effects
Although the estimated coefficient for the MERGER(t) variable in this model is significant, this specification only accounts for a temporary reduction of interest rates in the year of the merger. In order to test whether the effect on interest rates is permanent, I use a dummy variable MERGER(t,T) equal one in all years after one of the firm lenders is involved in M&As, and zero otherwise 17 . If there is more than one lender involved in M&A, this variable takes value one after the first merger in the sample period. Since the model includes firm fixed effects, this specification compares the average interest rate of a firm before and after one of its lenders participates in M&A.
The results in column two show that the average interest rate is 10.6 basis points lower in subsequent years after a bank merger.
To further disentangle the temporary and permanent effects, I estimate a model with the dummy variable MERGER(t) and a new dummy variable MERGER(t+1,T) that is equal to one in all years after one of the firm's lenders is involved in M&As except for the year of the merger itself. If the firm's lenders are involved in M&A in different years, this variable equals zero for all the years that a merger occurs. In this specification,
MERGER(t) captures the short run effect and MERGER(t+1,T) captures the long run 21
effect of bank mergers on interest rates. The results reported in column three show that there are significant short run and long run effects of mergers on interest rates of -10.9
and -9.7 basis points respectively (the average interest rate is 3.50 percent). However, the difference between the short run and long run effect is not statistically different from zero (F (1,51) =1.49, p-value=0.2284). Therefore, the preferred specification is column two. This suggests that the reduction in interest rates is permanent.
In sum, the main result presented in this section is that interest rates decline after a bank merger, which is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. The following sections focus on estimating the heterogeneous effects of mergers on borrowers of acquirer and target bank, overlap borrowers, and firms terminating the lending relationship with the consolidated bank.
Target versus acquirer borrowers
Most studies find that prior to the merger targets perform poorly compared to acquirers (Amel et al. 2004) . The descriptive evidence provided in section 3 also points in that direction. Therefore, efficiency gains are expected to be larger for target banks than for acquirers. A main contribution of this paper is to estimate differential effects between target and acquirer borrowers. If the main motivation for banks to merge is to increase efficiency (for instance, by replacing poorly performing target bank management), one should expect larger interest rate cuts for the target borrowers than for the acquirer borrowers. To test this hypothesis we define a dummy variable TARGET(t,T) that is equal to one in all years after one of the firm lenders is a target bank in a merger, and 18 The model is estimated by restricting the sample to firms that experience just one merger event during the sample period plus a control group of firms that are not affected by any merger. Although one may introduce sample selection by applying this criteria (for instance, smaller firms are likely to experience a smaller number of mergers due to their restricted scope on the number of lenders), the model is estimated with this restricted sample to avoid composition of effects. That is, the identification of effects due to the current merger with respect to the lagged effects of a previous merger are blurred. In this subsample the variables TARGET(t,T) and ACQUIRER(t,T) are never simultaneously equal to one. Although the number of observations is reduced by sixty percent, the results are qualitatively similar (target: -20.4 basis points, acquirer -5.8 basis points).
Overlap borrowers
There is a particularly interesting group of firms that have a lending relationship with both the target and the acquiring bank before a merger and continue the lending relationship with the consolidated bank after that merger. These "overlap" borrowers drop one lending relationship as a consequence of the merger. In this section I explore the effect of bank mergers for "overlap" borrowers. On the one hand, one should expect that overlap borrowers would be adversely affected by mergers because of the loss of one lending relationship which may imply a loss of bank-firm specific information and a reduction of bargaining power vis-à-vis lenders. This effect should be particularly important for firms facing high switching costs. On the other hand, overlap borrowers receive efficiency gains generated by the merger and may benefit from the combination of information of the two lending institutions into one.
To examine the differential effects for overlap mergers, I define a new dummy variable OVERLAP(t,T) equal to one in all years after a firm borrows from both target and acquirer in a given merger. Additionally, the variables TARGET(t,T) and ACQUIRER(t,T) are re-defined to be equal to one in all years after one of the firm's lenders is a target (acquirer) bank in a merger and no other lender is the acquirer ( The estimated results show that the effect on interest rates for continuing borrowers is now stronger while for discontinuing borrowers it is not significantly different from zero, even for target borrowers. The estimated results in column five show that the effect on interest rates for continuing borrowers is somewhat stronger while for discontinuing borrowers it is not significantly different from zero.
The distinction between firms that switch banks and firms that do not is particularly relevant for overlap borrowers because they experience an exogenous reduction of one lending relationship as a result of the merger. It is expected that overlap borrowers would be more inclined to establish a new lending relationship following a merger than borrowers of only one merging bank. In column six, overlap continuing borrowers are The coefficients estimated show that overlap borrowers experience a reduction in interest rates regardless of whether they are able to replace the lost lending relationship or not. We cannot reject the null of equality of coefficients (F (1,51) =0.01, pvalue=0.941). In the last column I estimate the model by including dummies of relationship termination and further dividing overlap borrowers that terminate the lending relationship with the consolidated bank between switching and non-switching firms. The estimated results are consistent with those discussed so far.
In sum, the results presented so far show that interest rates decline after a bank merger, which is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. The decline is permanent and larger for acquirer borrowers. Overlap borrowers show effects similar to target borrowers.
Firms terminating the relationship with the consolidated bank have effects similar to non-merging bank borrowers, and hence are included in the control group. For the remainder of the paper, I report the models corresponding to permanent effects using the variables TARGET(t,T) and ACQUIRER(t,T). The regressions with temporary effects, overlap borrowers, and dummies for terminating borrowers are always estimated; the results are discussed only when they differ from those reported in tables. The following sections focus on estimating the heterogeneous impact of mergers by borrower's characteristics and type of merger.
Borrower size and age
The impact of mergers can be stronger for firms facing more acute informational asymmetries and high switching costs. In this section I investigate whether bank mergers have heterogeneous effects depending on some borrower characteristics that proxy for their opaqueness. First, borrowers are classified by size in three categories:
micro, small and medium firms in the year of entering the sample. The model is estimated for each size subsample. Second, I select the youngest firms in the sample (firms that when entering the sample are less than five years old) and estimate the model for young firms by size category. The results are presented table 7. The first column 28 reproduces the results for the whole sample to facilitate comparability. Columns two to four show that there are not significant differences in the reduction of interest rates for acquirer and target borrowers by firm size. Furthermore, for the smallest firms in the sample (micro and small) the decline in interest rates appears to be even more severe than for medium firms. Columns five to seven further restrict the sample to young firms. The same pattern of results shows up: young and micro firms affected by bank merger activity experience the highest reduction in interest rates, followed by young and small firms; medium firms do not appear to gain as much as the smallest and youngest firms, however, the effect on interest rates is still negative (although less significant). In sum, the evidence presented here does not support the hypothesis that mergers disproportionally harm the most informationally opaque firms; on the contrary, the smallest and youngest firms in the sample appear to be the ones receiving more gains from mergers.
Bank size and ownership form
There is an ongoing discussion on the effects of bank size to small business lending.
Several authors argue that large banks created through mergers may not be responsive to the needs of small businesses (Peek and Rosengren 1998 , Berger et al. 1998 , Strahan and Weston 1998 , Berger et al. 2007 ). The reason is that large banks may have a disadvantage in lending to small and opaque businesses. For instance, Stein (2002) argues that large banks face organizational diseconomies and hence are at a disadvantage to use and transmit soft information, which is crucial for value enhancing lending relationships.
In this section I explore which types of consolidation produce the largest changes in loan interest rates. Following Delgado et al. (2007) , banks are grouped into three size classes: small (€1000 million in total loans or less), medium (between €1000 and 25,000 The results can be found in table 9. In panel A I estimate differential effects for target and acquirer borrowers for in-market, out-of-market and other bank mergers. For inmarket mergers, we observe that target borrowers experience a large decrease in interest rates of 20.7 basis points, which confirms the hypothesis that mergers entail larger cost efficiency gains the greater the market overlap. As I argued before, target borrowers are more likely to benefit from efficiency gains because target banks are usually much more inefficient that acquirer banks. Acquiring borrowers do not benefit as much from inmarket mergers because they already had a lending relationship with a quite efficient financial institution. From out-of-market mergers the reverse pattern arises: acquirer borrowers experience a larger decrease on interest rates than target borrowers. Merger gains when there is no market overlap basically arise from greater risk diversification.
Acquirer borrowers seem to benefit the most from improved risk management practices.
Next, I divide mergers depending on the increase in the degree of concentration in the provincial banking market as measured by the provincial HHI. I use three cut points for the increase in HHI: 50, 100 and 200. For instance, one group contains provinces in which the HHI increases by more than 100 points (113 province-merger observations) and the second groups contains the remaining provinces (1111 province-merger observations). The results can be found in panels B.1 to B.3. We observe a significant market power effect. The larger the increase in banking market concentration the lower the decline in interest rates. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even for the provinces with the highest increase in HHI (panel B.3) the estimated effects are still negative for target borrowers and only marginally positive for acquirer borrowers (none of these effects are statistically different from zero). In light of these results, we can conclude that increases in market power determine the extent to which banks share efficiency gains with its borrowers. I do not find support for the hypothesis that market power may dominate efficiency gains as is the case in Italy (Sapienza 2002 ) and the U.S. (Erel 2005) . None of the regression estimates shows a positive effect of mergers on interest rates, suggesting that market power effects have not been a concern in Spanish banking market.
To further check this conclusion, I divide in-market mergers in two groups: provinces in which the HHI increases by more than 100 points (113 province-merger observations) and the rest (371 province-merger observations). The results in panel C confirm the previous results that in-market mergers generate efficiency gains for target borrowers.
The effect is smaller for mergers that increase the concentration in the local banking market. Still, the effect is negative and significant. Acquirer borrowers benefit the most from out-of-market mergers. I confirm that efficiency gains from mergers prevail over the market power effects, so that borrowers benefit from banking consolidation.
Does self-selection explain the reduction on interest rates?
The interest rate reduction for continuing borrowers could reflect a self-selection mechanism according to which only the higher quality firms (or firms with certain characteristics) continue the lending relationship with the consolidated bank. When the new borrower pool is added in its portfolio, the consolidated bank reduces interest rates 33 to this high quality borrowers. In this section I perform a test of self-selection and then I estimate the model correcting for this bias.
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In order to test for selection bias, one can look for pre-existing effects of the mergers. I re-estimate the original model with the MERGER(t) variable but also include the lead of this dummy MERGER(t+1) that is equal to one if one or more of the firm lenders are involved in M&As in the following year t+1. The null hypothesis of no effect of merger on interest rates is rejected only if the coefficient on MERGER(t) is significant and the coefficient on the pre-merger dummy MERGER(t+1) is either insignificant or opposite signed. The coefficient of MERGER(t) is -0.049 (significant at 1%) and the coefficient of MERGER (t+1) is -0.004 (not significantly different from zero). This diagnostic test is consistent with no self-selection. Next, I estimate a two-stage model to correct for self-selection. In the first stage, I estimate a probit model for each t on the probability that a firm lender is involved in a merger, i.e. the dependent variable is MERGER(t).
The inverse Mills ratio of each regression is interacted with time dummies and are included in the main regression to control for selection bias. The coefficient of the MERGER(t) variable is somehow decreased to -0.040 (compared to -0.049 without correction) and remains highly significant. To estimate long term effects, we use the variable MERGER(t,T). The coefficient estimated is -0.090 (compared to -10.6 without correction). Overall, the results with correction for selection bias are consistent with those without correction. The interest rate drop for borrowers of consolidated banks does not appear to be driven by a selection bias in which acquiring banks simply identify good borrowers of poorly performing target banks.
Conclusion and implications for European banking market integration
This paper provides evidence on the costs and benefits of bank mergers to small business. On the one hand, mergers are harmful to small business because lending relationships are more likely to be disrupted following a merger. Small borrowers of target banks have a higher probability of having terminated a relationship with the consolidated bank. Moreover, small borrowers find it harder to start new lending relationship with consolidated banks. In sum, the higher termination rate for existing borrowers is not compensated with a higher initiation rate of new lending relationships with small business after the merger.
On the other hand, continuing borrowers benefit from mergers in terms of reduced loan rates. Small and young firms enjoy the highest decline in interest rates. The most beneficial mergers from the borrower point of view are those involving two large banks, which is not consistent with the existence of a "size effect" in lending. While the reduction in interest rates is larger when the acquirer and the target have some market overlap and, consequently, more potential for cost savings, the decline is much smaller when there is significant increase in local banking market concentration. That is, the change in local market concentration determines the extent to which efficiency gains are probably in terms of greater risk diversification, which are passed along to borrowers. In light of this analysis, one should expect that small businesses will benefit from increased cross-border M&A. Total assets are expressed in constant 2000 euros (thousand milions). ROA is EBIT over assets. Capital is subscribed capital over assets. Target and acquirer bank observations refer to the year before the merger and consolidated bank to the year after the merger. Probit estimates. Marginal effects on the probability of discontinuing the lending relationship evaluated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables. The dependent variable in Panel A is Terminate relationship that equals one in year t if firm i does not report having a relationship with bank k in year t+1. In Panel B the dependent variable Initiate relationship equals one in year t if firm i did not report having a relationship with bank k in year t-1. In columns 2-4 the model is estimated with the variables Target borrower, Acquirer borrower and Consolidated borrower interacted with three dummy variables (D1, D2, D3) defined according to firm characteristics. Column 2-borrower size (micro, small, medium), 3-firm age, 4-zscore. In Panel A, the last two rows present the Chi2 test for the equality of Target*D1 and Target*D3. The regressions also include 9 year dummies and 51 province dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 6 Continuing, terminating and switching lending relationships [2]
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